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Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America an increasing number of new actors relevant to the management of international security.
Even though states are still the key units in security affairs, other-formal and informalstructures of authority have become more influential at different systemic levels.
In short, the current security order is characterized by a higher degree of fragmentation and complexity than the centralized security system of the Cold War. To capture this global transformation, traditional models of security relations such as alliances (Wohlforth 1999) , security regimes (Krasner 1983) and security communities (Adler/Barnett 1998) must be complemented, and security governance is a promising concept in this regard. Adler and Greve (2009: 59) conceptualize the traditional models as different "security systems of governance" that can overlap or coexist across time and space, and apply Ruggie's (1993) "multiperspectivial" vision to regional security governance. For the purposes of our article, we will restrict and apply the governance concept to, on the one hand, the political field of security and, on the other hand, the regional level of analysis. Whereas the bipolar competition of the Cold War era largely overlaid regional security considerations, the security concerns of most states today are almost entirely regional and regions are an increasingly salient unit of analysis (Lake/Morgan 1997 , Lemke 2002 , Buzan/Weaver 2003 .
We assume that different systems of security governance overlap and coexist in South America. On the one hand, a variety of bilateral and multilateral security initiatives-most prominently the recent establishment of the South American Defense Council (CDS) under the umbrella of the Union of South American States (UNASUR)-reflect patterns of a nascent security community. On the other hand, key regional actors such as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela are engaging in armament and military alliances with external powers, namely, France, the United States and Russia (Flemes/Nolte 2009) . These alliances seem to result from the logic of power balancing and are potentially contributing to a regional arms race while also fueling already existing historical and ideological conflicts between neighboring states.
Hence, neither the traditional models of power balancing and alliance building nor the security-community approach can sufficiently explain the security dynamics in South America.
Our empirical analysis will, thus, be informed by two distinct and often competing systems of rule, by different ways of conceiving of power and by different security practices such as mechanisms for conflict resolution (Adler/Greve 2009: 63) ; in our exercise we will focus on the latter.
With a view to the region under consideration, a further differentiation of the actors relevant to the management of regional security is reasonable. Unlike the case in Europe, national sovereignty is still the clearly dominant underlying norm of South American regional politics in general and South American security affairs in particular. Thus, the participation of private and other actors (NGOs, academic organizations, media) in regional security management and decision making is highly restricted. Other relevant non-state actors such as guerrilla armies and organized crime will be addressed here as security threats or challenges, but not as constructive actors or managers of regional security. Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America 7 Reinforcing this view, we reject the tendency of "securitization" (Waever 1995) enhanced by the concepts of "human security" and "societal security". Even though it is true that South America's security is endangered by more than military threats, the analytical utility of widening the traditional concept of national security through the inclusion of economic, health and environmental aspects is questionable. The enlargement of the security agenda through the inclusion of social matters transforms the latter into matters of state security, making illconceived military approaches to these issues more likely. This applies particularly to South America, where the armed forces have traditionally played a key role in politics by intervening militarily in domestic affairs and still exert great influence in the security sectors of many states (Flemes 2004 , Radseck 2005a . With a view to security thinking and the different systems of security governance, most military institutions, including South America's armed forces academies, still adhere to balance-of-power thinking and practices, even though other parts of the policy-making bureaucracy, such as the diplomatic corps, have deeply internalized security-community discourses and practices. In order to delineate the analytical scope of this article, regional security governance will be understood as an order-creating mechanism:
Regional security governance denotes formal and informal structures of authority that coordinate, manage and rule collective responses to threats to the security of states in a delineated region or common efforts of these states to promote security and stability outside their region. Collective security challenges can be subdivided into interstate conflicts, domestic crises affecting regional stability, and transnational threats. The unilateral, bilateral and multilateral structures of authority can be codified in formally binding institutional forms, but they may also be identified in the norms of behavior and action accepted informally among the regional states.
South America is confronted with all of the above-mentioned sets of security challenges. Interstate conflicts, domestic crises and transnational security threats might even overlap and interrelate in some South American border zones (Fuentes 2008: 13) . The region's policy makers, aware of this highly complex security agenda and in spite of their striking differences, 2 seem increasingly disposed to building a regional-security governance structure.
South America's structures of authority and the region's ability to solve conflicts has become more important than the respective inter-American bodies over the past decade. Given this shift in the management of regional security affairs, it is questionable that a multilevel ap- 2 Alongside common values such as democracy and human rights articulated by all South American state leaders, the region is marked by power asymmetries and sharp ideological cleavages: some South American states, such as the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez and the Bolivia of Evo Morales, no longer share the market economy paradigm. In stark contrast, Chile, Colombia and Peru have signed bilateral free trade agreements with the US. And while Bogotá seeks security and military cooperation with Washington in the framework of the Plan Colombia, Caracas feels threatened by a potential military intervention by the US. Brasilia takes a moderate stance and tries to mediate between these polar positions. 8 Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America proach by an overarching security architecture is more effective than separated governance schemes regarding to each specific security threat. How functional have the different structures of authority been in managing South America's multilevel security agenda? With this question in mind, the present article (1) defines the region's security agenda, (2) identifies the region's structures of authority in terms of core security functions (containment of transnational threats, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacebuilding), and (3) addresses the different forms and cases of multilevel security governance emerging in South America.
The Region's Security Agenda
South America's security agenda is an extensive, multilevel and complex one. It demands the simultaneous management of domestic crises, interstate conflicts and transnational threats.
Though located at different systemic levels (national, international, transnational), the three conflict clusters are often interrelated and tend to overlap in the region's border areaswhich is why they are often referred to as "border conflicts" in the media. 3 However, for analytical reasons it is important to make a distinction: While "classical" border conflicts are disputes over frontiers, the so-called "new border conflicts" are permanent conflict matrices at settled, but often uncontrolled, frontiers serving as cross-border theaters for operations by organized crime actors or as areas of retreat for guerrilla groups. By assigning the "new border conflicts" to the conflict cluster of transnational threats, we do not deny their dual characteristics. Quite the contrary: it is evident that South America's borders zones have become "hot spots" because traditional and new threats tend to overlap and mutually intensify one another in these often poorly patrolled spaces. This is illustrated most obviously in the case of Colombia, where the continentʹs longest-running armed conflict has already infringed on all neighboring countries. 4
Domestic Crises
The epicenter of South America's domestic crises is the Andean subregion. The threat to democracy and security is based on the crises' potential to radiate to and encroach on neighbor-3 Examples are the continuously occurring "border conflicts"-most notably in the Amazon-with drugs and arms smugglers, illegal migrants and clandestine gold prospectors. Even the serious diplomatic crisis between Ecuador and Colombia in March 2008, sparked by Bogotá's violation of its neighbor's sovereignty when Colombian troops attacked a base of the Colombian guerrilla group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) inside Ecuador, has been labeled as "border conflict" in the media. 4 As a result of the US-supported "War on Drugs" and through the Plan Colombia, which puts military pressure on the Colombian drug cartels and the FARC, coca cultivation, cocaine production and rebels were edged out even beyond the country's borders. Hence, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are already plagued with the effects of the drug trade and guerrilla activities (armed struggle, kidnapping). Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America 9 ing states and, therefore, to compromise the political stability of the subregion as a whole.
While the crises differ clearly in terms of their conflict potential, we distinguish between domestic crises affecting the political order, democratic governability and territorial integrity:
• Domestic crises affecting the political order: Though South America's armed forces are no longer on the front line appointing themselves as governors, they are still partly important political actors. Since the region's last wave of democratization, two successful coups d'état (self-coup of Peruvian president Fujimori in 1992, irregular overthrow of Ecuadorian president Mahuad in 2000) and four attempted military coups (Paraguay 1996 and 2000 , Venezuela 1992 7 To make matters worse, the current president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, has added fuel to these flames and, in doing so, has compromised the security and stability of the subregion as a whole. 8 5 With the domino effect in mind, when military regimes emerged in the 1970s across almost the entire subcontinent, it was an imperative of the region to prevent the overthrow of democratically elected governments. In addition, South America, aware of the fragility of the region's democracies, is consistently committed to democracy as the "only game in town." In the 1990s, democracy promotion and protection clauses were adopted by the OAS, the Rio Group, the Andean Community, and the MERCOSUR. 6 The project of Bolivia's former President Sánchez de Losada to export natural gas via Chile became a catalyst for extremely violent protests, which saw approximately 60 people killed, and led to the premature resignation of his government in October 2003. 7 The "ethnocaceristas" demanded the resignation of former President Toledo, whom they accused of selling Peru to Chile because of extensive investments by Chileans in the Peruvian economy. The movement is called "ethnocacerist" in honor of General Cáceres, the nineteenth-century president of Peru who organized a guerrilla war against the Chilean occupation after the Pacific War of 1879. The movement wants to arm Peru for war with Chile in order to recover Arica, the territory that remained in Chilean possession after the Pacific War. The "ethnocaceristas" also revile Ecuador. 8 Venezuela's president Chávez not only dreams of "taking a bath at a Bolivian beach" but is also not afraid to interfere in the domestic affairs of alleged "sister states," as he did in the last presidential elections in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru by providing support to "his" populist-nationalist candidates Morales, García and Humala (Kozloff 2009 ). 10 Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America • Domestic crises affecting territorial integrity: Socioeconomic disparities which strongly correlate with provincial or local entities have become a threat to the territorial integrity of the region's (centralist) states. In Bolivia, the demands of the resource-rich eastern provinces for greater regional autonomy have escalated into a warlike conflict with the central government of President Morales; the wealthiest department, Santa Cruz, wheeled by the high commodity prices, has even threatened secession. Fundamentally, the clash is a struggle over revenues from the country's vast natural gas and oil reserves. 9 A similar conflict emerged recently in mineral-rich Peru. The Garcia government declared martial law in the southern department of Tacna (bordering Chile) in 2008 in order to contain violent protests against its decision to revise a law that regulates the distribution of mining revenues (Slack 2009 ). OPEC-member Ecuador, with its persistent regional conflicts between the coast, the highlands and the oil-rich Amazon area, demonstrates high potential to become the next victim of a domestic crisis affecting its territorial integrity.
Interstate Conflicts
A second cluster of South America's security agenda consists of long-standing territorial conflicts and border disputes, so-called traditional threats (Domínguez 2003a (Domínguez , 2003b . When South American states became independent in the 1820s, most of their external frontiers were the largely unmarked administrative borders of the colonial empires. The disputed territories and boundaries have consistently been the subject of diplomatic crises or have even turned into arenas of military operations within the eight wars that have taken place so far in the region. 10 Actually, only 27 percent of the region's contemporary frontiers-measured according to their overall length-can be traced back to colonial times; of the remainder, 26 percent have been defined by wars, 17 percent by unilaterally imposed claims to power, another 17 percent by bilateral agreements, and 13 percent by contended arbitrations (Foucher 1991) .
This bellicose legacy has strongly affected the region's attitudes and patterns of behavior.
Hence, it is not the exception in South America when (neighboring) nations face each other with mutual distrust and resentment or generals extrapolate disputed areas to a casus belli, partly following geopolitical assumptions in their conflict scenarios (Child 1985) . Longstanding territorial disputes, which have already resulted in armed conflicts, have now trick-9
The mixed-race elite in the eastern lowlands wants greater control over local revenues, while Morales, who is supported by the impoverished indigenous majority of the highlands, wants the wealthier eastern departments-which account for most of the country's natural gas production, industry and gross domestic product-to contribute more to the poorer west. Territorial and border conflicts in South America share the mechanism which sparks them, even though the former type of conflict appears to be motivated mainly by a prestige mentality and (wounded) national pride and the latter seems to be more strongly linked with material interests, in particular, (potential) oil and mineral deposits and fish. 11 The region's interstate conflicts are often fueled by domestic motives and power-political calculations. The region's populists in particular appeal in old-fashioned caudillo style to the rah-rah patriotism of their countrymen in order to distract from internal deficiencies and to ensure the general public's support. The political instrumentalization of interstate conflicts, especially in times of crises, helps to explain why the same old disputes flare up over and over again-but also refreeze repeatedly-without ever being settled.
With two emblematic cases having recently been peacefully resolved-Argentina and Chile settled all remaining disputes in 1994, and Ecuador and Peru signed a peace accord in 1998 (Herz/Nogueira 2002 , Bonilla 1999 )-at least three territorial conflicts and four border conflicts, mainly involving Chile and Venezuela-remain in South America:
• The Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute: Landlocked Bolivia has made claims to Chilean territory, which would enable sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, for 130 years. Bolivians see this territorial claim, now magnified to a vital national question, as compensation for their mineral-rich littoral department, annexed at the end of the nineteenth century by the Chilean military. Since any agreement requires the approval of the Peruvian government, the case is particularly complicated. Lima has vetoed every attempt at an agreement between La Paz and Santiago in the past (Maldonado 2005) . Hence, albeit off the record, Chileans consider Lima's behavior in this dispute as proof of its revanchist longings, since Peru, as well as Bolivia, supposedly never overcame the loss of its coastal provinces in the Saltpeter War (1879-83).
• The Argentina-United Kingdom territorial dispute: Argentina has made claims to a group of islands in the South Atlantic Ocean in the possession of the United Kingdom. The islands have been a British Overseas Territory since 1833; the most famous are the Falklands/Malvinas. Even after its defeat in the Falklands War (1982), Buenos Aires repeatedly reasserted its historical claim, which is actually fixed as an imperative in the country's constitution (Schindler 1998: 29ff.) . Guyana has been intensified by the discovery of vast off-shore oil and gas reserves in the disputed territorial waters. In 2000, a Canadian oil company, conducting exploration with the permission of the Guyanese government, was expelled from the contested area by the Surinamese military in a demonstration of force.
Transnational Threats
The third cluster of South America's multilevel security agenda consists of transnational, socalled new threats. In the following we will limit our analysis to the region's most challenging and often overlapping cross-border threats: organized drug crime, guerrilla organizations and transnational terrorism. First, government officials and academic observers agree that organized drug crime is the principal transnational threat in South America (Rojas Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America 13 Aravena 2006 ). Second, cross-border guerrilla organizations and paramilitary forces can hardly be analyzed separately from organized crime activities such as arms and drug trafficking. Third, guerrilla groups such as the FARC and paramilitary forces such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) have been branded terrorist organizations by Colombia, the United States and the European Union. The other South American states have avoided connecting these actors in the Colombian conflict to the global threat of radical Islamic terrorism by using this notion. Fourth, until today there has been no evidence of Islamist terrorist cells in South America; therefore, the region is not confronted with a concrete threat from Al-Qaeda or related extremists. Intelligence services have observed financial flows from Muslim communities in the tripartite border area between Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina to "welfare groups" in Palestine that may have been subsequently transferred to extremist groups. And fifth, although organized crime is also highly present in South America's urban centers, particularly in Brazil and Colombia, transnational threats culminate in the peripheral border areas of South America, where they overlap with the abovementioned dimensions of the region's multilevel security agenda.
One of the most complex situations is that along the southern border of Colombia, where the territorial control of border zones by paramilitaries and guerrilla militias has permitted the relatively stable cultivation of coca. In particular, an important part of the Colombian-Ecuadorian border is under control of the FARC and is marked by child prostitution and the traffic of drugs, arms, and human beings. 12 Colombia's frontiers with Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil are the locations with the highest murder rates in these countries. According to mostly unconfirmed reports, FARC units also occasionally cross the Venezuelan-Brazilian Amazon border, on the one hand to evade the Colombian army and on the other to traffic drugs and arms. Brazil's Amazon frontiers are likewise notorious for their sparse population and limited state presence. For instance, the border to Suriname, a transfer country for cocaine whose security forces and government officials are tainted by allegations of involvement in trafficking networks (Briscoe 2008: 4) , is virtually uncontrolled.
Another focal point of transnational threats is Ciudad del Este, on the Paraguayan side of the tripartite border zone between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. It has been denominated a "lawless" area because of poor state control in the face of several illicit activities: arms and drug trade, marijuana production, money laundering and the smuggling of genuine and faked goods (Fuentes 2008: 7) . Additionally, the city has long been suspected by the Argentine and US intelligence services of harboring active jihadist cells in its large Lebanese and Syrian trading community. However, claims that cells located in the tripartite border area What the remote border zones of South America have in common is that the rule of law has been replaced by drug tsars and guerrilla forces who rule with an iron hand. The dilemmas of tackling illicit trafficking and the presence of armed groups along these frontiers are most clearly reflected by the dispute between Colombia and Ecuador over the former's bombardment of a FARC camp in the latter's territory in March 2008. In addition to the overlapping of transnational guerrilla and organized crime activities with the underdeveloped rule of law and the domestic Colombian conflict, the dispute between Colombia and Ecuador was fueled by ideological differences, including the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez, and therefore led to a regional diplomatic crisis. Colombia and Venezuela have not consensually demarcated their border, and political rivalry is used in both countries to deflect internal conflicts by unifying the nation against an external enemy. The diplomatic hostilities and the alleged mobilization of the Venezuelan army that followed Colombia's bombardment can be interpreted as the first military manifestation of the Bolivarian alliance and the consolidation of Colombia's status as a leading US ally (Briscoe 2008: 4) .
Structures of Authority Impacting Regional Security
In the following discussion we will divide the structures of authority impacting South America's security governance scheme into unilateral, bilateral and multilateral ones, not depending on the formally binding or merely informal features of these structures. Unilateral structures refers to key state actors, inside and outside the region; bilateral structures refers mainly to defense and military cooperation mechanisms; and multilateral structures implies issue-related bodies and instruments at the regional and the hemispheric level.
Unilateral Structures of Authority
South America's unilateral structures of authority are projected by those regional and extraregional states that pursue their interests most effectively on the basis of their material capabilities or ideational and diplomatic resources. These power resources can be converted into political influence through the creation and shaping of regional institutions or through the mediation of domestic and interstate conflicts in South America, both practices which are in accord with the powerful state's (security) interests. In this regard, we will shed light on the roles of the regional power Brazil and the United States, the most influential external player. 13 Brazil is South America's key actor, even more so in terms of regional security than economic affairs. This is because Brazil's readiness to provide public goods differs with regard to the issue area under consideration. Brasilia is not ready to pay the costs of economic integration (Flemes 2007) , but it is willing to do what is necessary to provide regional stability. The willingness to do the latter can be explained by the expected economies of scale induced by providing regional security and protection. Brazil not only plays the leading part in defense and security cooperation in South America (Flemes 2006) , but it has recently been increasing its military spending in order to secure its status as the region's dominant military power (Flemes 2008) . 14 Furthermore, as the only Latin American country, Brazil has controlled the technology to enrich uranium since 2006; however, it is not willing to accept the IAEA demands that it sign the additional protocol of the NPT. The military upgrading added, for instance, to the only aircraft carrier in service in Latin America is justified in Brazil's new National Defense Strategy (END), published in 2008. The central factor stressed in this document is the effort to achieve for energy security by protecting offshore oil and gas drilling through military power projection and deterrence. In this regard, Brazilian conflict hypotheses include the intervention of "extra-regional powers," namely, the US, in the South Atlantic and the Amazon, where Brazil's natural resources are concentrated.
Unlike investments in regional states' economies, the volume of Brazil's investments in regional stability-for example, through the acquisition of military technology and equipment intended to project force over distance (in particular, sea and air capabilities)-varies relatively little in relation to the number of states included in the regional sphere of influence.
The number of beneficiaries of the stability induced by Brazil has increased over recent decades from Argentina alone to the Southern Cone and then to South America as a whole. This has led to the problem of free-riding: Brazil's neighbors have received the benefits of the counterproposal to the US-led project of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Additionally, Venezuela projects power by concluding biregional and subregional energy agreements that create dependence among the raw-material importers. Venezuela's resource-based diplomacy constitutes a competing leadership claim to that of Brazil. It is true that Venezuela is an alternative partner for smaller countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador, something which gives these states room to maneuver in their bilateral relations with Brazil. But unlike Brazil, Venezuela lacks broad international legitimacy, something which is a precondition for projecting unilateral authority in peaceful conflict resolution. President Chávez was only once, and exceptionally, accepted as a mediator in the Colombian conflict. 
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Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America evolving social order "for free", without having to accept its rule or comply with its demands. A solution to the problem of free-riding has been the multilateralization of the Brazilian commitment to South American stability through the CDS. Mutual aid and reciprocity are the main principles for avoiding free-riding and increase regional states' dependence (Lake 2009 ). The CDS reduces the number of independent alliances among regional states and increases Brasilia's influence over their security policies.
In addition to their functional dimension as responses to the increasing regional interconnectedness, regional governance structures such as the CDS and UNASUR feature a power dimension. They are instruments of domination, promoting of the dominant state's interests through its agenda-setting capacity (Nolte 2009 , Tussie 2009 ). Brazil's cooperative hegemony (Pedersen 2001 ) strategy aims not least to aggregate power in the regional context in order to project power to the global level-for instance, with a view to its ambitions to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As the collective good of regional stability induced by Brazilian security initiatives also serves the interests of minor regional states, it is less likely that the regional governance structure will be used to hedge against Brazil. In addition, Brazil shares an interest in excluding extra-regional players from South American security affairs with most regional actors.
However, the process of region building has been limited first and foremost by one external The theoretical assumption that security governance structures can overlap and change across time and space is also confirmed by the fact that the US is still part of the South American security order. In 2008 the US Navy announced the reactivation of its Fourth Fleet to patrol Latin American waters. The fleet, originally established to defend US oil interests in Venezuela during WWII and dismantled in 1950, will be the Navy component of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). It will conduct contingency operations and counternarcoterrorism and so-called theater security cooperation (TSC) activities. Colombia can be seen as the bridge into South America which allows to Washington to project (military) power in the region. Intra-regional relations have been seriously strained by Bogotá's military and political proximity to the United States. Contrary to the region's mainstream tendency, President Uribe has fostered relations with Washington, as evidenced by the recent extension of the US military presence in Colombia. US military personnel will use seven Colombian military bases for the next 10 years in order to support Colombia's anti-drugtrafficking strategy, known as Plan Colombia. The competing unilateral structures of authority applied by Brazil and the US to South America clearly reveal the power dimension of regional governance. But this competition might be overshadowed by the functional dimension as both players are interested in regional stability. In this regard, Washington has delegated power to Brasilia by confirming its regional power status on several occasions.
Bilateral Structures of Authority
Bilateral structures of security governance have been established, on the one hand, in order to tackle transnational threats such as the cross-border drug trade and, on the other hand, in order to build trust between the armed forces of neighboring states and to coordinate their defense policies. With a view to the former, Brazil has established anti-drug commissions (Comisiones Mixtas Antidrogas) with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela.
These commissions aim to support collaboration between the federal police forces and intelligence agencies of the participating states. With regard to the latter, a dense network of bilateral military and defense cooperation in South America includes, for instance, common maneuvers, personnel exchange and military-technical collaboration. The defense and military cooperation, with its confidence-building impetus, is centered among Argentina, Brazil and Chile; these states have built a security community since the 1990s (Flemes 2006) .
The starting point for the institutionalization of bilateral defense cooperation dates back to 1995. Since then the COMPERSEG, which sits semiannually, has ensured a continuous political security dialogue between Argentina and Chile. This committee paved the way for a standardized methodology for the equalization of the defense budgets of the two countries and for the establishment of a binational battalion for joint peacekeeping operations in 2006.
The military contingent Cruz del Sur is modeled on the German-French battalion. A precedent was set by he UNFICYP mission in Cyprus, where Chilean troops were embedded in the Argentine contingent. Brazil and Argentina also established a bilateral consultation mechanism for defense issues (MCC/MAE) in 1997. Since 2000 Brazil has been holding bilateral working groups for defense policy (GTBD) with most South American countries, and in 2001 the security and defense committee (COSEDE) between Chile and Peru was established 18 Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America as a forum to discuss the different views on bilateral issues such as the maritime border and to build trust between the Chilean and Peruvian armed forces.
These coordination committees have strengthened the role of the traditionally weak defense ministries, particularly in relation to the military institutions. Nevertheless, the political dimension of intra-regional defense collaboration is still affected by structural deficiencies, which are assigned to the problem area of civil-military relations. The armed forces still dominate the bilateral working groups as well as the consultation mechanisms. Besides the lack of participation of civilian experts, the bilateral institutions suffer from a lack of transparency as the meeting records are mostly classified.
Multilateral Structures of Authority
The key multilateral structures impacting security governance in South America are the UNASUR and the MERCOSUR. Additionally, the Rio Group impacts security governance at the Latin American level, and the OAS at the inter-American level.
During the era of bipolarity, the OAS reflected the Cold War's " The IADB was finally established in 2006 as an entity of the OAS. It provides technical advice and services to the OAS (demining programs in Central America, reporting on confidence-and security-building measures). 16 The effectiveness of these agreements, however, is limited, not least because of the lack of consensus inside these regimes on many issues (Diamint 2004) . Furthermore, all institutional mechanisms of the "Inter-American Security System" are characterized by weak infrastructure and very limited influence and, hence, by their need of reform. The wait-and-see policy towards the reform of the "Inter-American Security System" adopted by most Latin American states supports the assumption that particularly those South American states headed by Brazil are not interested in a hemispheric security system. Their lack of commitment indicates that the status quo is preferred to any change that would strengthen the US position in the region. From this perspective, it remains questionable whether, on the one hand, the lack of consensus and institutionalization is Perceived to some extent as an alternative body to the US-dominated OAS, the region's political security consultation mechanism, known as the Rio Group, is an international organization of Latin American and some Caribbean states. The group dates back to 1986 and the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro, signed by the eight members of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group, both of which mediated the Central American conflicts in the 1980s. The Rio Group's perpetual commitment to adapt itself to the new regional and international scene led to its successive expansion. 17 It never actually became a permanent body; it is administered by a rotating and temporary secretariat and relies on yearly summits or extraordinary sessions with the heads of states. A political dialogue with the EU at the ministerial level, institutionalized in 1990, deals with peace and security issues such as drug trafficking and transnational terrorism.
Signed in May 2008 in Brasília, the UNASUR is an intergovernmental union integrating two existing customs unions: MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations. 18 It is intended to be modeled after the EU, with free trade agreements among the members, free movement of people, a common currency, and also a common passport. Its provisional structure includes the CDS-alongside a parliament, a bank and a scheduled council that would focus on drug trafficking and organized crime. Brazil originally wanted the CDS to be a NATO-like mechanism based on the principle of collective defense but was confronted with resistance, particularly from Colombia. The 12 members of the UNASUR ultimately agreed to the establishment of the CDS as a mechanism for conflict prevention on the basis of mutual consultations. 19 With two extraordinary summits held to date (Santiago de Chile 2008, to less striking in the South American context, and on the other hand, if the hegemonic role of the US is simply being replaced by Brazil as South America's dominant player. 17 Cuba, expelled from the OAS in 1962, joined the group in 2008 as the organizationʹs twenty-third member.
What has officially been labelled as a measure that "makes the Rio Group more representative, stronger, more inclusive [and] more plural" (Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa, cited by Cortes 2008) in truth counters the group's basic commitment "to democracy, the rule of law, the protection and promotion of human rights." 18 The genesis of UNASUR dates back to December 2004, when the South American presidents met in Cuzco, Peru to establish the South American Community of Nations. But even before Cuzco, the presidents had been holding summits, since 2000, and had set up various mechanisms aiming to promote continental integration. One significant mechanism is the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America democracy clause stipulates the immediate expulsion of any member whose political system does not comply with democratic norms. Additionally, the FCCP prepared the Ushuaia Agreement, which declared the MERCOSUR a peace zone. In this regard, the FCCP developed a mechanism for crisis prevention to secure regional stability and a MERCOSUR clause refusing residence to persons found guilty of genocide. 21 The key tasks of the RED include the prevention of drug abuse and the rehabilitation of drug users. The re- can troops and is commanded by Brazil. 22 It is demonstrating, for the first time in history, the South American states' willingness and capability to handle regional crises by themselves. A so-called 2x9 mechanism, created to discuss common policies and concerns regarding Haiti and MINUSTAH, includes the deputy ministers of foreign affairs and of defense from the nine Latin American troop contributors (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay).
Forms and Cases of Multilevel Security Governance
In the following discussion we will analyze the functioning of the region's multilevel security governance scheme. We will therefore demonstrate how particular conflicts and security challenges have in the past been tackled by the structures of authority discussed above. For analytical reasons we structure the cases according to our three conflict clusters. In the subsections we proceed chronologically in order to shed light on the changes and shifts that have occurred within the region's specific security governance schemes.
The Domestic Level
The dominant method of resolving domestic crises in South America is mediation (see Table   1 ). Exceptionally-and only outside of South America, in Haiti-the South American governments intervened in 2004 with a military and police presence on the basis of a UN mandate in the context of the stability mission (MINUSTAH). 22 The multilateral peacekeeping force consists of more than 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries. Brazil has deployed the greatest number of troops with 1,200 men who are meant to protect the inhabitants' security in Oviedo's direct challenge of the constitutional rule and that they would not tolerate a disruption of democracy in a member state. MERCOSUR members issued a communiqué noting their profound concern regarding the events in Paraguay, which they characterized as constituting "a serious menace to democratic institutions and the constitutional order." Hereby, Ecuador 2000: International pressure, especially from the US, probably influenced the Ecuadorian armed forces' decision to facilitate the return to civilian rule. In fact, the OAS intervention and the advertisement of the US government's intention to impose economic sanctions if the democratic institutional process in Ecuador was interrupted by a military government seem to have been decisive in the peaceful resolution of the coup d'état against Ecuadorian president Mahuad. The MERCOSUR, too, strongly objected to the irregular overthrow of Mahuad. In a communiqué, Brazil and its fellow member countries condemned the coup and called for the preservation of the rule of law and the upholding of the constitutional process. Furthermore, the Rio Group expressed its grave concern and denounced "any attempt to disrupt constitutional order and democratic institutions." of the Rio Group, which happened to be meeting at the same time the coup was unfolding.
The Rio Group governments reacted strongly to the attempted coup, issuing a joint statement which firmly condemned the "interruption of constitutional order" and called for the "normalization of democratic institutions." (Gauthier 2006) . In 2006, the Haitian government and the UN Security Council cosigned an agreement on the reform of Haiti's national police force in order to create a professional 14,000 person force that would be able to meet the country's basic security needs by 2011. However, the state institutions, including the police and the justice and prison systems, remain particularly weak. Human rights violations allegedly committed by national police officers and the problem of impunity continue to be a deep concern. In short, despite of these efforts and 43 fatalities amongst the military and civilian UN personnel, the common efforts of the UN in general and the South American states in particular to promote security and stability in Haiti by reforming the justice and penal systems and professionalizing the police force have yet not been successful. tion) that they would not tolerate any threat to Bolivia's territorial integrity (Malamud 2008) .
This statement reaffirmed an analogue declaration of the Rio Group from April 2008 which had announced the group's "strong support to preserve unity and territorial integrity" for the Morales administration. The members of UNASUR also agreed to establish a commission to investigate the massacre that had occurred in Pando.
Honduras 2009: On June 28 democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya was ousted by the Honduran army after he defied Supreme Court orders to cancel a referendum on the rewriting of the constitution. While the Honduran Congress replaced him the same day with its president, Roberto Micheletti, the entire hemisphere, including the United States, immediately denounced the coup. The OAS called for an emergency meeting and issued a statement calling for Zelaya's return, saying it would not recognize any other government.
Though Zelaya was denied permission to reenter Honduras, he returned on September 21 and took refuge at the Brazilian embassy. Brazil supports Zelayaʹs demand to be reinstated and has not pressured him or his supporters to leave the embassy. In answer, the de facto government of interim president Micheletti filed a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on October 29 accusing Brazil of meddling in internal Honduran affairs by allowing ousted president Zelaya to stay at its diplomatic mission in Tegucigalpa and by using the embassy ʺas a platform for political propaganda […] thereby threatening the peace and internal public order of Hondurasʺ as authorities prepare for the November 29 presidential election. So far, it is not clear if the court will take on the case of an administration installed following a coup. Brazil immediately disputed the claim, saying the de facto Honduran government has no legitimacy to lodge a lawsuit at the ICJ.
The Interstate Level
The region's territorial conflicts and border disputes-resolved or not-have normally been managed either through mediation or through arbitration (see Table 2 ). The latter seems to be the preferred approach, because arbitration is seen by most of South American govern-26 Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America ments as the most firm and binding way to resolve such conflicts definitely. That said, bilateral negotiations between the parties to a conflict can also lead to success, as demonstrated by Argentina and Chile in the 1990s. 
Bilateral negotiation
Mediation Arbitration Argentina-Chile, 1994 Ecuador-Peru, 1998 Colombia-Venezuela, 2002 Argentina-Uruguay, 2006 Guyana 
Transnational Threats
The MERCOSUR has developed several practical mechanisms to prevent and contain trans- In spite of these promising initial steps, transnational police collaboration is undermined by several shortcomings. For instance, many MERCOSUR states lack clear distinctions between military and police security forces: some federal police services are housed at defense ministries, and armed forces and military intelligence services are often legally assigned to repress organized crime. Additionally, the relationships between these security forces are sometimes marked by considerable rivalry, which hinders collaboration even at the national level. In addition to the overcoming of these shortcomings of the national security sectors, legal harmonization at the regional level is vital for operative police cooperation. The prerequisite of The data network consists of three components-data relating to persons, goods and criminal cases-and depends on the member states' readiness to provide this information. Data with reference to people include national as well as international arrest warrants, previous convictions, and missing persons announcements, as well as visas issued and refused. Data relating to goods refer to confiscated vehicles, vessels and aircrafts. Additionally, the database stores the serial numbers of seized arms. A register for cargo containers records the imports and exports of MERCOSUR countries in order to detect the transportation routes for smuggled goods. The data relating to solved and unsolved criminal cases includes information on police operations carried out in the individual states. This information exchange aims to identify transnational overlaps and connections between different cases and thus lays the ground for bilaterally or multilaterally coordinated measures at the operative level.
RED meetings have been conducted once or twice a year and have so far been dominated by the development of complementary strategies for border protection. In order to enable more efficient control of the trade in those pharmaceutical products and chemical substances that are potentially used for the production of drugs, the MERCOSUR countries have committed to informing each other on the export of these products. For this purpose, national registers recording the import and export of pharmaceuticals have been set up in the member states.
With regard to the containment of the illegal trade in chemical drugs, the federal police forces of the MERCOSUR states simultaneously carried out the transnational operation Seis Fronteras, coordinated by the RED, in 2002 and 2003. In the course of this operation the respective security services arrested several drug dealers, confiscated chemical drugs, and destroyed drug production sites.
The crucial reason for the inclusion of transnational terrorism on the regional security agenda was the terrorist attacks on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and on the AMIA Jewish community centre in 1994. Through these suicide attacks in the country with South America's largest Jewish community, more than 100 people were killed. After the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 the RMI announced far-reaching collaboration against the intensified terrorist threat and an upgrading of the GTE through the creation of a Permanent Counterterrorism Working Group (GTP). The participating experts include officials from the foreign, finance and interior ministries as well as intelligence and federal police agents. The activities of the GTE/GTP, both of which meet every two weeks, consist of the exchange and analysis of 
Conclusions
South America seems to be disposed to the creation of its own security governance scheme.
Novel defense and security structures and the region's contributions to peacekeeping missions under its own direction provide evidence in this regard. These changes go along with and fit in with regional efforts to strengthen a common political profile, as showcased by the formation of the UNASUR, and to become emancipated from traditional US hegemony, as evidenced by the various countries' preference for South American-, Latin American-, or even UN-based conflict resolution schemes over those of inter-American bodies and instruments. However, the continuing presence of the US military on the subcontinent demonstrates that the regions' emancipation from the US ends whenever Washington's vital security interests are concerned. The expansion of US military engagement in Colombia and the growth of Brazilian cooperation initiatives into Central America and the Caribbean demonstrate how regional-security governance structures overlap and travel over time and space.
Though it is too early for a conclusive assessment of the nascent regional security governance model, it is clear, first, that the South American security governance scheme will primarily be 30 Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America a state-centric one, with little input from parliaments or non-state actors. The strong bias in favor of the executive authorities and especially the presidential figures may provide the necessary flexibility given the complexity of the region's multilevel security agenda-an agenda which culminates in the region's border zones, where traditional and new threats overlap and are mutually intensifying at different systemic levels (domestic, interstate, and transnational). In contrast, the strong personalist component will make the scheme incalculable and its outputs more dependent on the willingness and the "chemistry" between the heads of state than on institutionalized or at least formalized structures of authority.
Second, the current security governance scheme confirms South America's liability to informal ad hoc proceedings or at least to appeal to UN arbitration, when interstate conflicts and domestic crises are tackled, mostly successfully.
Third, in the case of transnational threats, the regional security scheme's underlying principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention will impede real progress as long as regional state and non-state actors are not willing to view the threatened border areas as a common security space whose effective control requires the same transnational course of action to which the organized crime and guerrilla groups have resorted to for years. Beyond a doubt, the softening of these dominant and sacrosanct principles would imply an enormous step in a region which still maintains classical territorial and border disputes.
Fourth, at first glance the region's security governance scheme displays a strong impetus of multilateral structures of authority, even beyond the containment of transnational threats, which can hardly be managed in another way. Cases involving the arbitration of interstate conflicts by the UN courts are exceptions as the ruling power is thereby delegated to multilateral bodies outside the region, which decide unilaterally once the conflicting parties agree to submit their case. However, the analyses of domestic and interstate conflicts demonstrate that conflict management inside the multilateral bodies of the region is mainly based on unilateral structures of authority, with Brazil as the outstanding regional state actor. Brazil is the most important initiator and the dominant agenda setter in South America's security governance institutions. It has played pivotal roles in most multilateral mediation and intervention efforts, particularly at the domestic level. Multilateralism must be strengthened by upgrading and democratizing the regional cooperation schemes at the political level, as at the operative level, in order to downplay the inherent structures of unilateral authority. As long as the power dimension overshadows the functional dimension of regional governance, South America's multilevel security challenges can hardly be managed effectively.
Fifth, even though regional stability is a shared interest of all regional and extra-regional state actors, the diverging preferences of the key players imply-even in medium -termserious limits to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the region's security governance schema.
The region's key actors differ clearly in terms of motives, the perception of threats, and their interests in meeting the region's security challenges. Even more harmful, most South American states, due to mutual mistrust or power-driven calculus, maintain their ambiguous bal-Flemes/Radseck: Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America 31 ancing act between rhetorical trust-building and conventional military armament. Thus, the empirical analysis in this paper has reinforced our assumption that different systems of security governance and different security practices coexist in South America. The practices of power balancing and participation in the security community even interact; for instance, when unilateral and multilateral structures of authority compete within the UNASUR and its defense council, or when regional states engage in external armaments alliances while disapproving of extra-regional influence and claiming that the management of regional security is an exclusively South American affair.
Beyond the way structures of authority are codified in South America's security governance scheme, its effectiveness and legitimacy depends decisively on the context the security scheme as a whole is embedded in. Two variables seem to be crucial: the patterns of civilmilitary relations, which differ notably in the region in terms of civil supremacy and military autonomy, and the patterns of interstate behavior, which is partly marked by deep-seated distrust and resentment as a result of the region's tumultuous past. In this regard, the initial reforms within the defense ministries, the institutionalization of bilateral and multilateral security dialogs, and the creation of binational military contingents have marked significant progress, contributing to both real confidence-building and the securing of peace. The fact that an increasing number of non-state-actors (universities, think tanks, media, schools) are now engaging in security affairs too, launching exchange programs for students, publishing in common or creating academic networks on regional defense and security, is also promising.
